La législation contemporaine anti-terroriste britannique a été caractérisée par l'utilisation considérable de mesures extraordinaires de détention : la

I. INTRODUCTION "The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve"
Lord Hoffman in
8 than the anti-terror legislative "disorder" of the preceding century, constituting an "incremental extension" 9 of temporary and emergency legislative provisions.
The TA 2000 is relevant for the post 9/11 anti terrorism legislation in general as it continues to shape and frame the course of contemporary anti-terror legislation, with the basis of many of today's provisions being "the direct descendant of decades of counter-terrorist laws" 10 forged as a legal response to the troubles in Northern Ireland.
11
A. Northern Irish Legislation
The troubles in Northern Ireland called for a resolute response by the UK "introduced limited procedural safeguards," 15 converting internment measures into interim custody orders, which limited an individual's detention under the Act to 28 days, unless their case was referred to a commissioner for determination. The commissioner, could under section 5 make a detention order, under which the duration of the individual's detention was unlimited. 16 This series of legislative powers effectively allowed "internment … intended to prevent suspected terrorists, who were unlikely to be convicted in a criminal court, from continuing their active service in paramilitary organisations."
17 Consequently, these measures were challenged before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as a contradiction to Article 5 of the ECHR in the pivotal case of Ireland v UK, 18 where the ECtHR held that "the existence of such an emergency … [was] … perfectly clear from the facts summarised. "
19 The court, with a remarkable degree of deference to the British authorities, held that the "national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it" 20 and that the "the British Government ... [was] reasonably entitled to consider that normal legislation offered insufficient resources for the campaign against terrorism. " 21
B. British Legislation
As a consequence of the Northern Irish conflict, which saw an increased threat of terrorism for the British public at home, a series of Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 22 were enacted by Westminster: they all were temporary in nature and re-enacted (or amended) on a regular basis. Such measures were however focused on pre-charge detention within the remit of the traditional criminal justice system. Consideration of these powers is vital, due to the 24 on the proviso that a police constable had "reasonable grounds for suspecting" 25 that the individual was "concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism."
26 Such detention constituted a prima facie breach of Article 5(3) ECHR, which provides individuals shall be "brought promptly before a judge or other office authorised by law to exercise judicial power," and was argued in the application in Brogan v UK. 27 There the ECtHR held that there was a breach of Article 5(3) ECHR due to the lack of a judicial control over the decision to extend any detention period under s 12( 31 "by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment … to decide both on the presence of … an emergency and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it." 32 Accordingly it was held "there can be no doubt that such a public emergency existed at the relevant time," 33 allowing the derogation and effectively the restriction of the individual's rights under Article 5 of the ECHR.
The importance of such an explicit endorsement of the UK's ability to derogate from one of its core ECHR obligations is evident, as these provisions continued to exist until the enactment of the Terrorism Act 2000 and continue to affect the legal culture of anti terrorism legislation to this day.
C. The Terrorism Act 2000
The Terrorism Act 2000 [TA 2000 ] was an attempt to address a number of concerns: the enactment of the HRA of 1998 in 2000 produced the need for "a more thorough rights audit of existing anti-terrorism provisions:" 34 in order to limit the need to derogate from Article 5 of the ECHR and to account for a 36 This was to be achieved by showing a "greater willingness to allow judicial and independent scrutiny." 37 Consequently, the TA 2000 featured as a safeguard for the proposed seven days pre-charge detention 38 as its strongest anti terrorism measure, the procedural requirement whereby an application to a judicial authority for a warrant of detention 39 had to be made. With the TA 2000, anti-terror legislation seemed to have returned to the ambit of domestic legality within the parameters of the normal UK criminal justice system and the ECHR, with derogations removed and extreme measures such as internment and detention without trial jettisoned.
However, the unfolding events of 9/11 and the subsequent "war on terror" would change this: past measures and provisions utilised in Northern Ireland would be recalled as the Government faced a new kind of threat: the threat of "franchised" Islamist terrorism at home and abroad.
III. THE ANTI-TERRORISM, CRIME AND SECURITY ACT 2001 AND A V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was "heralded as necessary to fortify the gaps and weaknesses in the UK's counter-terrorism laws exposed by the attacks in America." 40 These gaps were considered serious enough to necessitate the ATCSA being "carried though Parliament with expedition," 41 receiving Royal Assent, merely a month after its first reading. 42 Such a speedy legislative process was enabled by "debate in the House of Commons … [being] … severely curtailed by time-tabling motions." 43 The sceptre of emergency legislation, cast aside by the TA 2000, seemed to have returned when the UK faced a new terrorism threat.
Part IV of the Act attracted the most criticism and required a notice of derogation 44 Following such detention the suspected terrorist could be deported under section 22, or, as was far more likely, detained under section 23 if their "removal or departure from the United Kingdom [was] prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely) by -(a) a point of law … or (b) a practical consideration."
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In practice these principles, along with an inability to prosecute many such detainees under normal criminal law, "because the evidence against them … [was] … based on sensitive intelligence which … [could not] … be presented to a court," 51 led to a regime of indefinite detention without trial. The olive branch of voluntary deportation appealed to relatively few detainees as they did "not wish to do so because they would return to a regime which [was] oppressive." 52 The very Government which had -after the end of the "troubles" with the Belfast agreement of 1998 -repealed legislation enabling internment "describing it as 'a process that is against the rule of law and undermines democratic principles'" 53 reneged on its own conviction when finding that "detention [was] the lesser of two evils between letting a suspected terrorist organise freely or overriding a fundamental human right." from the United Kingdom. Such detention was successfully challenged as the Secretary of State "was under a duty to act promptly in carrying out the process of deportation and he should not exercise the power of detention unless the person subject to a deportation order could be deported within a reasonable time." 61 
B. Judicial challenges to the
Chahal
62 concerned a foreign national detained for a number of years pending his deportation on national security grounds. Such a potential deportation was successfully challenged, as "whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion." 63 Part IV of the ATCSA thus aimed to end "a perceived dangerous mismatch between the threat of foreign terrorism and the compulsory protection required by international laws relating to asylum or human rights of foreign dissidents." 64 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department was a challenge to the legality of the ATCSA based on the conviction that "in the absence of either an actual, or a specific and imminent, terrorist attack on the United Kingdom, there was no 'public emergency threatening the life of the nation;' that the measures were not proportionate" 65 and that the special detention regime under the ATCSA was discriminatory on grounds of nationality and/or immigration status," In regard to questions of proportionality and discrimination, the provisions of the ATCSA were held to be disproportionate on the grounds of a discriminatory effect, 72 which was not "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation," 73 as required by Article 15. Consequently it was ruled that "the part 4 regime was incompatible with articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR."
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A v Secretary of State for the Home Department remains a significant judgment to this day particularly in regards to the "approach of the … judges ... to the question of justification … [and] … whether security justified detention without trial." 75 The ruling marks a turning point in terms of judicial scrutiny of actions of the executive in connection with the War on Terror. Judicial deference had in effect "all but evaporated in relation to the question about whether a national security issue justifies some specific course of action," 76 thus exemplifying the crucial role of the House of Lords in "reviewing executive action against the benchmark of human rights" 77 in the context of the detention of terror suspects. This declaration of incompatibility had far reaching consequences for government and judicative alike, with the former appearing "to feel morally (or at least politically) bound to jettison the detention-without-trial regime." Lord Hoffman went even further warning against an "over-expansive interpretation to the concept of deprivation of liberty," which would create "a restriction on the powers of the state to deal with serious terrorist threats to the lives of its citizens." 100 The minority consequently could only see a potential breach of Article 2 of Protocol No 4 to the ECHR which concerns the freedom of movement but not Article 5 of the ECHR.
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IV. THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2005 AND ITS JUDICIAL CHALLENGES
The uniqueness of the control order regime was acknowledged by the court as a "difficulty attending the process of classification … [of Control Orders in relation to whether they are ECHR compliant or not]…. suggesting that in such cases the decision is one of pure opinion,"
101 dampening the potential authority of Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ. After all it was held in Guzzardi that "the difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance."
102 Lord Brown provided guidance on the issue of how long control order curfews should be to remain ECHR compliant by finding that "I would regard the acceptable limit to be 16 hours. withhold evidence used to support the grounds for making the Control Order, 109 from the individual concerned, due to national security concerns. 110 To mitigate such a closed evidence procedure, provisions are made for the use of a special advocate procedure, 111 whereby a security vetted advocate is appointed who is privy to the closed material, but unable to relay this to their client. Such "nondisclosure of the closed material" meant that "the very essence of the right to a fair trial hearing was impaired in the control order proceedings" 112 and subject to a judiciary review in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB.
Lord Carswell agreed that "it may be legitimate to withhold a certain amount of significant material from a party where there are sufficiently strong countervailing reasons to set against the individual's right grounded in Art. 6" 113 such as public interest, a balancing act between the two conflicting interests had to be struck to avoid "the grave disadvantages of a person affected not being aware of the case against him."
114 Therefore the fact that the defendant "was confronted by a bare, unsubstantiated assertion which he could do no more than deny," 115 was sufficient to find a violation of Art. 6 of the ECHR and the control order in question. The majority decision held that "with strenuous efforts from all, difficult and time consuming though it will be, it should usually be possible to accord the controlled person "a substantial measure of procedural justice," 116 whilst still protecting national security and keeping evidence closed, with only few exceptions in cases where "to do so would be incompatible with the right of the controlled person to a fair trial."
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C. Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (FC) and another and one other action
The 125 was that "the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions … [to the special advocate] … in relation to those allegations," 126 with the ECtHR stating that "non-disclosure cannot go so far as to deny a party knowledge of the essence of the case against him" 127 The principles of the earlier MB decision appear to have been replaced with "a rigid rule that the requirements of a fair hearing are never satisfied if the decision is " based solely or to a decisive degree" on closed material." 128 Consequently, Lord Hoffman expressed his fear that such judicial review may very "well destroy the system of control orders."
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The full effect of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF is unknown at this time, as the cases "must now return to the lower courts to be reheard." 130 However it appears that the "Home Office will need to decide either to release more material to the men and to the public, or rescind the orders."
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The Home Office "has released [AF] regarded as one of Britain's most dangerous terror suspects … to avoid disclosing evidence against him."
132 This administrative decision "could prove to be the final nail in the coffin of the system": 133 if the "Government is unwilling to make public what it knows, or believes, about AF, then it is unlikely to be prepared to disclose what intelligence it holds about the other 19 men living under control order restrictions." 134 We will see whether the ruling in AF will be regarded as the "water shed" moment of the control order regime: the end to the regime per se, or a the catalyst for further amendment of the regime to allow suspects such as AF to be detained within the scope of the ECHR.
D. Consequences of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF?
Prior to Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF, the judiciary broadly regarded the control order regime as being ECHR compliant, despite quashing a number of the control orders. This served to "to dispel some of the tension be- tween the executive and the judiciary at this crucial time," 135 but has been made possible by some remarkable concessions by the judiciary, allowing "significant inroads into core civil liberties." 136 The fallout from Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF has yet to be felt. Faced with the possibility of having to reveal more closed evidence, the British Authorities may choose to abandon a discredited Control Order regime, rather than reveal sensitive sources of intelligence. Worryingly, derogation from Art. 6 of the ECHR may be forthcoming, should the Government deem it necessary to maintain the Control Order regime, whilst deeming it impossible to countenance revealing further evidence.
Until the full effect of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF can be assessed, the following considerations should be made to address some ECHR compliancy issues, violations respectively: the introduction of a statutory limit on the length of curfews inherent in control orders strengthens further the obiter of Lord
Brown in Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ
137 and may be a "small step to take, but it will serve to remove some of the ambiguity in this area," 138 as -arguably -only one obiter is "a very slender legal basis" 139 on which to assess ECHR compliance. With regards to the considerations of the special advocate procedure, it was "undoubtedly right … [to find] … that the … procedures [do] go at least some way to redressing" 140 concerns regarding the use of closed evidence. However the process remains "far from perfect" 141 and ECHR compliance remains a concern. The "insertion of an express reference to the right to a fair hearing" into the statutory framework, 142 removing any potential ambiguity in terms of section 3 of the HRA, 143 
and the reading down technique employed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB
144 would further mitigate such concerns. "The imposition of an obligation … to provide a statement of the gist of any closed material" 145 used in hearing proceedings would further ensure Article 6 compliance here. Nonetheless the viability of such reforms is highly questionable, considering the inherent national security implications.
Unease surrounds the potential indefinite nature of control orders. Statutory clarity should be sought here most vehemently as "some of the controlees have 135 Middleton, supra note 83 at 4. 136 Sandell, supra note 107 at 124. 137 JJ, supra note 3 at para. 105. 
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146 "A statutory presumptive clause against the extension of control orders beyond two years, save in genuinely exceptional circumstances" 147 should be considered seriously. Despite such concerns, the above mentioned judicial limitations have already made "an incursion into the exceptional procedural framework within which control orders operate," 148 curtailing the worst excesses of the regime. Some sort of compromise, aligning the judicative with the executive approach, would surely be preferable to an otherwise "unwelcome and scarring clash with the senior judiciary" 149 akin to that in the case of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department and which would eventually lead to the necessity to draft new legislation.
V. THE TERRORISM ACT 2006 AND PRE-CHARGE DETENTION
This contemporary legislative provision for the extended pre-charge detention of terror suspects runs concurrently to the quasi-judicial detention provisions of the PTA 150 as detailed above. Pre-charge detention builds on the foundation of the provisions of the TA 2000, whereby under section 41 of the TA 2000 a police constable may arrest "without a warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist," with a pre-charge detention of the suspect for up to 7 days. The Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006) aims at being in line with the recent developments of the ECHR law, particularly Art. 5, as a consequence of the experience of the Northern Irish Troubles and its legal challenges before the ECtHR, particularly the cases of Brannigan 151 and Brogan.
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The initial power to detain a terror suspect for a period of seven days precharge under TA 2000 153 was further extended: a terror suspect may now be detained by virtue of sections 23, 25 of the TA 2006 154 for a total period of 28 days, 155 amending therefore Schedule 8 of the TA 2000.
156
A. The new detention procedure under the TA 2006
The detention of terror suspects is for the first time scrutinized after the normal 48-hour pre-charge custodial limit: "in the absence of authorization for continued detention, a terror suspect must be released after 48 hours in 157 Hereafter a "warrant of further detention" 158 issued by a judicial authority 159 must be applied for, enabling detention for a maximum of seven days from the time of arrest. This period can be extended by way of an "extension of warrant" 160 which enables detention up to a maximum aggregate of 28 days from arrest. Whilst such an extension appears to be alarming, extensions of warrant can only be for seven days beyond the first 14. As an additional safeguard, reflecting the gravity of the length of the pre-charge detention, after 14 days any further extension to the detention period must be heard before a senior judge, 161 or high court judge.
One considerable concern in the context of the issuance of such warrants of extension raises from the possibility of detention in order to obtain evidence. Under Schedule 8, para. 32(1) -(1A) of the amended TA 2000
162 "a judicial authority may issue a warrant of further detention if it is satisfied that,"
163 "the further detention of a person is necessary … to obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him or otherwise," 164 an extremely wide provision. Indeed "it is difficult to conceive a case where there would not be outstanding enquiries to be made 'with a view to obtaining relevant evidence.'" 167 the criminal charging procedure, formulating a new "Threshold Test," to be used "in cases where it is inappropriate to release a suspect on bail," 168 with terrorist cases being a prime example. Such changes mean an individual can be charged if "there is at least a reasonable suspicion against the person of having committed an offence" 169 as opposed to the normal PACE provision that a person be charged where there is "sufficient evidence to charge that person for the offence for which he was arrested." 170 The existence of such a new liberal criminal charging procedure carries "at least as many and certainly more concealed risks of causing unfair extended detention." 171 The danger of possible Article 5 ECHR violations is apparent; charging on the basis of reasonable suspicion could merely mirror continued 184 To many, including the JCHR, this does not "satisfy the stringent requirements …of … Article 5 ECHR" 185 as the "the hearing … is not a fully adversarial hearing." 186 Such shortcomings are remarkable considering the extensive use of Special Advocates in Control Order proceedings, which provide an ECHR -compliant model that could be mirrored here.
That the House of Lords Appellate Committee has yet to decide such an issue is merely due to the fact that "there is no right of appeal against a judicial decision extending pre-charge detention." 187 Judicial review has been sought regarding the potential Article 5(3) and (4) ECHR implications of not providing the right to appeal, but failed on technical grounds. 188 A more successful common law challenge to these provisions may provide interesting results. In the mean time reform in this area is needed, to ensure full ECHR compliance.
The pre-charge detention regime provided by the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006, appears prima facie to be ECHR compatible.
VI. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION MEASURES
Despite ardent judicial opposition and some reform overall, ECHR -compliance of the discussed detention measures remains a difficult issue, due to the fact that they all authorize substantial restrictions of liberty without criminal charge. Ideally "counter-terrorism measures ought not to be extraordinary measures in a special category of their own, but, as far as possible, part of the ordinary criminal law of the land." 189 The following alternatives might end the present situation, as injustices will inevitably arise from such measures. 190 Firstly, the introduction and wider use of a refined system of "Threshold Charging" in order to charge terror suspects rather than to detain them under extra-ordinary provisions.
As discussed above, the use of Threshold Charging within the remit of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) 191 criminal charging procedure, allows the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to charge an individual using a lower evidential threshold "in cases where it is inappropriate to release a suspect on bail," 192 for example in terror cases. Rather than charging an individual where there is "sufficient evidence to charge that person for the offence for which This threshold is only used "provided there is a reasonable likelihood of relevant evidence becoming available within a reasonable time which will enable the [normal] higher charging threshold to be applied," 195 at a later date before trial: an inherent safeguard against prolific use of the new evidential threshold.
Threshold Charging could therefore be used to charge terror suspects earlier and on a lower evidential threshold, thus negating current stated difficulties charging terror suspects due to a lack of court-admissible evidence: one of the main arguments for the use of pre-charge detention. Facilitating post-charge judicial detention and allowing time post-charge to gather more evidence could bring more suspects within the remit of the "normal" criminal justice system; preferable to extended pre-charge detention and its inherent ECHR compliancy issues.
The use of such a regime carries its own Article 5 considerations, which need to be addressed. Recommendations for such a regime include placing the test "on an explicit statutory footing" 196 and that the "CPS be required to disclose to the suspect and the court when it has charged on the threshold test in order to provide the opportunity for the court to subject the prosecution's timetable to independent scrutiny." 197 Such reform would ensure that the use of the Threshold Test does "not operate in practice in a way which impinges disproportionately on the liberty of the individual." 198 Threshold Charging could offer a viable alternative to extended pre-charge detention, when used in combination with a Post-Charge Questioning regime.
Section 22 of the (largely unsuccessful) Counter Terrorism Act 2008 provides that "a judge of the Crown Court may authorize the questioning of a person about an offence after the person has been charged with the offence … if the offence is a terrorism offence or it appears … that the offence has a terrorist connection." 232 were attributable to the use of intercept evidence, none were for terrorist offences.
A similar system operates in Canada whereby all "law enforcement intercept material is useable in evidence … subject to disclosure rules." 233 Protection from disclosure of sensitive intercept techniques is provided by The Canada Evidence Act (CEA) 1985 section 37; providing for the protection of police techniques, intelligence and informants [when] in the public interest. 234 Should an objection be lodged by the defendant under section 37 against the non-disclosure of such information, "the court will determine whether the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in non-disclosure." 235 Despite being an attractive model to the UK authorities, allowing intercept but protecting sensitive techniques, the Canadian model produces a relatively low conviction rate; of those cases "where intercepted material was [cited] in evidence" 236 the conviction rate was only "between 20% and 46% from 2001-2003" 237 compared to a 90% conviction rate where intercept techniques were used to gather evidence, but no intercept was cited in evidence. 238 The benefits of using a similar intercept regime in the UK are thus debatable.
Concluding, one can state that the use of intercept evidence and post-charge questioning within the ambit of the "normal" criminal justice system could alleviate any continued need or want for extensive pre-charge detention and quasijudicial detention. The prospect of the use of post-charge questioning is very However the prospects of the future admissibility of intercept evidence are rather dim: highlighted by the Chilcot Review, 241 the operability of the British intelligence branches requires that the secrets of intercept techniques be protected from too much public scrutiny.
VII. CONCLUSION
The use of extra-ordinary anti-terror detention still raises questions of ECHR compliance to this day, despite the meandering course of legislation in the last decade Recourse to "normal" criminal processes is advocated as an ideal to end this myriad of compliancy issues. The use of alternatives such as post-charge questioning used in tandem with Threshold Charging, could constitute an altogether different approach which would align anti-terror measures fully with the parameters of the "normal" criminal justice system. The admissibly of intercept evidence in criminal proceedings could also instigate such a change. Caution should accompany such reform, as it is essential that the ability to foil terror plots, safeguarding national security, be retained.
What does remain clear is that detention measures as discussed in this article should not remain a permanent fixture in a modern, civilized society, due to the inherent dangers of creating permanent limitations of our civil liberties: for "once a power is granted, it tends to extend its empire by 
